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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KOLAND LAVAE DENISON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
—vs.— 
ALVIN D. CHAPMAN, CONTINENTAL 
OIL COMPANY, a corporation, and 
DOEA HAETLEY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
EESPONDENTS' ALVIN D. CHAPMAN AND 
CONTINENTAL OIL COMPANY'S BEIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We cannot accept the statement of facts as set forth 
in the appellant's brief. While we recognize that in a 
case where a verdict has been directed in favor of the 
respondents, the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the appellant, we believe that counsel for the appellant 
has overlooked the equally familiar principle that the 
testimony of a witness can be no stronger than it is left 
on cross-examination. In the instant suit, there is very 
Civil 
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little conflict in the evidence. All of the witnesses were 
called by the plaintiff, and there is no substantial dis-
pute in their testimony. The facts relevant to the issues 
of this appeal may be briefly stated as follows: 
On the evening of the accident, the defendant Dora 
Hartley was enroute to a meeting in Orem (T. 63). She 
entered U.S. Highway 91 from the east side thereof, at 
the point where it is intersected by what is known as the 
Carterville Eoad (T. 63). Pr ior to entering the high-
way, Mrs. Hartley stopped in response to ,a stop sign, 
and observed for traffic approaching from the left or 
south (T. 64). She observed the Continental Oil truck 
approaching at a distance about two blocks away (T. 65). 
She entered the highway ,and proceeded northerly along 
the extreme easterly edge of the highway (T. 66). She 
was not certain whether she was entirely in the right 
hand lane of the highway, or partially in the right hand 
lane and partially on the right shoulder (T. 68, 73, 74). 
The street was covered with ice, and the lines marking 
the lanes of traffic were not visible (T. 68). The rear 
wheels of her car were equipped with snow tires, and it 
was in good mechanical condition (T. 66). She pro-
ceeded very slowly up the hill, at a rate of speed esti-
mated by her at approximately 15 miles per hour (T. 67). 
She had had previous experience in driving this hill 
under wintry conditions; and she was cognizant of the 
perils involved (T. 67). She had her car completely 
under control (T. 68). At about the time the oil truck 
reached her (in the left hand lane for north bound 
traffic), she suddenly ("quick as a flash") lost control 
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of her car, and it spun in a counter-clockwise direction 
("spun sideways out into the lane of traffic") (T. 70, 71). 
I t made only about a quarter of a turn when it came 
forcibly into collision with something else, and then spun 
clockwise, finally coming to rest on the right hand, or 
east shoulder of the highway, and facing in a southerly 
direction (T. 71). None of the foregoing testimony is 
disputed by any other witness. 
The defendant Chapman, operator of the oil truck, 
testified that he had stopped for the semaphore light at 
the bottom of the Orem hill (T. 90). When the light 
changed to green in his favor, he started up the hill in the 
extreme right hand lane. He observed the Hartley car in 
the lane ahead of him, (T. 86), and as he approached it, 
he swung out into the center lane to pass (T. 91). She 
did not appear to be having any difficulty, nor did her 
car appear to be out of control (T. 87, 90). As he was 
about to pass her car, it suddenly went out of control, 
and slipped or skidded into the pathway of his truck, 
coming into collision therewith, and causing him to lose 
control (T. 91, 93, 94). Notwithstanding Chapman's 
efforts to iiold the truck on the right side of the road 
(T. 93), it slid diagonally across the highway, where it 
finally came to rest with the front end against the guard-
rail on the west side of the highway (T. 94). At about 
the time the truck came to rest, it was struck by the 
plaintiff's automobile (T. 95). This testimony of Chap-
man is also undisputed. 
The plaintiff testified that on the afternoon of the 
accident, he had been with his boys attending to their 
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horses in the northern part of Orem (T. 115). It had 
been snowing all afternoon (T. 115). They were return-
ing to their home, but at about the top of the Orem Hill, 
the plaintiff decided to drive down the hill to the service 
station to fill his tank with gasoline (T. 118). On direct 
examination he testified that he was traveling at about 
35 miles per hour two blocks north of the top of the hill, 
(T. 116), but that he slowed down, although to what 
extent he did not know, anticipating that he would turn 
off the highway toward his home (T. 117). After he 
started down the hill, he never again used the accelerator, 
(T. 117), and after testing his brakes and finding that 
they would not decelerate his car, he shifted down into 
second gear to further reduce his speed (T. 118). How-
ever, on cross-examination he admitted that according 
to his best judgment he was traveling 35 miles per hour 
at the top of the hill, (T. 131), and at a point only 200 
feet north of the point of impact, he was traveling at 
30 miles per hour (T. 132). He was aware of the danger 
of an accident when the defendant's truck was 50 to 60 
feet away, (T. 122), but he was unable to stop in time 
to avoid a collision, and he struck the truck with such 
force and violence that his car bounced back up the hill 
six to eight feet (T. 15, 128), and both vehicles were 
damaged to the extent of $1200 (T. 132). That he was 
going at a speed of 35 miles per hour at the top of the 
hill was corroborated by his son Douglas (T. 153). The 
plaintiff admitted that he had lived in Orem for 7 years ; 
that he was thoroughly familiar with the Orem Hill; 
that in periods of adverse weather, the hill was usually 
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more slippery and difficult than the level road; and 
that he had reason to anticipate that the hill would be 
more slippery than the level road on the night of the 
accident (T. 128). 
Mrs. Hartley testified that after the accident, the 
plaintiff said that he was going too fast for existing con-
ditions (T. 75, 76, 78, 80, 81). He did not deny making 
such an admission (T. 127). 
I t is true that officers Levin and Loveless testified, 
over objection, that in their opinion, the maximum safe 
speed on the Orem hill on the evening of the accident 
was 10 to 15 miles per hour, (Levin) (T. 19); or 20 miles 
per hour, (Loveless) (T. 43). We believe that this was 
inadmissible opinion evidence, since it called for a con-
clusion on a subject on which laymen are capable of form-
ing valid opinions without the need for expert assistance. 
However, both witnesses admitted, on cross-examination, 
that they had had no experience in operating a transport 
truck and trailer of the kind being operated by Chapman, 
and that their opinions were based purely upon their 
experience in operating ordinary passenger type ve-
hicles (T. 32, 45). They admitted that they were not 
qualified to give an opinion as to what would be a safe 
speed for a truck and trailer having in mind the differ-
ence in weight, traction, controllability, etc. (T. 31, 32, 
45, 46). On the other hand, the witness Chapman who 
had had considerable experience in the management of 
such equipment, (T. 98, 99), testified that in his opinion, 
35 miles per hour was a safe speed for the truck and 
trailer on the evening of the accident, and a safer speed 
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than a lesser speed would have been (T. 105, 111, 112). 
He pointed out that at lesser speeds, there would be 
dangers of the equipment stalling on the highway, or 
"spinning out," which would imperil not only that equip-
ment, but also other traffic on the highway (T. 104,105, 
108). The opinion of Chiapman was the only opinion of a 
qualified witness as to the safe speed for the operation 
of a tank truck and trailer, and is not disputed or con-
troverted by any admissible evidence. 
We particularly wish to note our dissent to the state-
ment on page 2 of the appellant's brief, that Denison 
slowed down to about 15 miles per hour as he approached 
the crest of the hill. We have searched the record in vain 
for any testimony to support that statement. There is 
considerable evidence to the contrary, which comes from 
the mouth of the plaintiff himself, and his infant son. 
We also disagree with the statement that Chapman was 
approximately one foot west of the dividing line between 
the two north traffic lanes. The only basis for such a 
statement is the opinion testimony of Officer Levin that 
the point of impact was one foot west of the dividing line 
(T. 21). But Chapman testified that he was "right 
against" or "over a little bit" from the center line (T. 
91). The evidence shows without dispute that Mrs. Hart-
ley was at all times on the extreme right hand side of the 
road, and that Chapman was in the proper lane to pass 
the Hartley automobile. 
All of the witnesses agreed that at the time and place 
of the accident, the highway was covered with ice, and 
was extremely slippery. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS TO BE BELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT 
CHAPMAN ATTEMPTED TO PASS THE HARTLEY AUTO-
MOBILE AT A DISTANCE SO CLOSE THAT THE JURY 
WOULD BE JUSTIFIED IN FINDING HIM GUILTY OF 
NEGLIGENCE. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANT CHAPMAN WAS NOT DRIVING AT 
AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF SPEED, AND THE ACCIDENT 
WAS NOT CAUSED BY ANY EXCESSIVE SPEED ON THE 
PART OF CHAPMAN. 
POINT III. 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAS NO 
APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
POINT IV. 
IF DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF ANY NEGLI-
GENCE, PLAINTIFF WAS EQUALLY GUILTY OF CONTRI-
BUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
PBELIMINABY STATEMENT 
Plaintiff's argument appears to be predicated upon 
a false premise. He apparently proceeds on the erron-
eous assumptions that because the accident occurred on 
the plaintiff's own right hand side of the road, and that 
the defendant's oil truck was at the moment of impact 
on the wrong side of the road, that as a matter of law 
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the plaintiff was free of fault, and that one or more of 
the defendants must have been guilty of some actionable 
negligence. Neither of these assumptions is well founded. 
In at least four decisions of this court, a driver on 
the right side of the road has been held guilty of negli-
gence in failing to avoid collision with an automobile on 
the wrong side of the road. In Farrell v. Cameron, 98 Ut. 
68, 94 Pac. (2d), 1068, this court affirmed a finding by 
the trial court that the defendant was guilty of negli-
gence, in failing to turn out and avoid the autombile 
in which plaintiff was riding, and which was approaching 
12 to 15 inches across the center line and on the wrong 
side of the road. In Ercanbrach v. Ellison, 134 Pac. (2d) 
177, the plaintiff was held guilty of negligence, although 
entirely on his own right side of the road, in not slowing 
up or stopping to permit the defendant's truck to com-
plete the passing of another automobile proceeding to-
ward the plaintiff. In Thomas v. Sadleir, 162 Pac. (2d) 
112, the defendant was held liable to a plaintiff who was 
riding as a passenger in an automobile traveling partly 
on the wrong side of the road, since the defendant failed 
to travel in the extreme right hand lane, but was traveling 
in the lane nearest the center of the highway. And in 
Horsley v. Robinson, 112 Ut. 227, 186 Pac. (2d) 592, the 
defendant was held liable to a passenger in its bus, for 
failure to avoid striking an automobile which skidded 
out of control on a slippery highway, and passed in front 
of the defendant's bus. Incidentally, in the case last 
cited, the driver of the car which went out of control, and 
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into the pathway of the bus, was exonerated from lia-
bility. 
The cases above cited leave no room for doubt, that 
the mere fact that a person is upon his own right hand 
side of the highway, does not relieve him from all re-
sponsibility to be alert for traffic which may cross his 
path, and to avoid collision with such traffic when there 
is a reasonable opportunity to do so. 
Equally fallacious is plaintiff's contention, that be-
cause the truck of the defendant came upon the plain-
tiff's side of the highway, it must have been negligently 
operated. The evidence not only shows without dispute, 
but the uniformity of the testimony emphasized, that the 
highway at the time and place of the accident was 
covered with ice, and was extremely slippery. It is well 
settled that the mere fact that ,an automobile skids or 
slides on a slippery highway, is not evidence, in and of 
itself, of negligence on the part of the operator thereof. 
If the automobile was carefully operated, and was caused 
to skid through no fault of the operator, but due to the 
conditions of the highway beyond his control, then the 
operator is not guilty of negligence, and the accident is 
deemed unavoidable. See 5A Am. Jur. 346, 347, 439, 
Automobiles and Highway Traffic, Sections 193, and 341. 
The same rule has been recognized by this court. In West 
v. Standard Fuel Co., 17 Pac. (2d) 292, this court said at 
page 294: 
" There is no evidence that plaintiff did not 
have his automobile under control unless it may 
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be said that the fact that his automobile skidded 
into the truck is such evidence. Such fact may 
not be said to show as a matter of law that plain-
tiff did not have control of his automobile." 
See also 3-4 Huddy, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, 
Section 68, Page 120. The same rule is followed and 
numerous cases are cited in support thereof, in the anno-
tations in 58 A.L.E., at page 261, and 113 A.L.E. 992, 
both relied upon by the plaintiff. 
So far as the defendants Chapman and Continental 
Oil Company are concerned, there is no need for specu-
lation or conjecture, as to the cause of the oil truck skid-
ding out of control. The evidence is undisputed that the 
oil truck was proceeding northerly on its own side of the 
road, and in the proper lane for passing the Hartley 
automobile. While thus lawfully proceeding along the 
highway, it was struck by the Hartley automobile, which 
had momentarily skidded out of the control of its opera-
tor, and collided forcibly with the oil truck, thus forcing 
the oil truck out of the control of its driver, Chapman, 
and across the highway, and into the pathway of the 
plaintiff. There is no dispute that the oil truck was 
knocked out of control by the Hartley automobile, and 
not by any act on the par t of its operator. 
As we understand the plaintiff's position, he relies 
for recovery against the defendants Chapman and Con-
tinental Oil Company on two grounds: First , that they 
attempted to pass the Hartley automobile, at a too close, 
or unsafe distance; and secondly, that the truck was 
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operated at an excessive rate of speed in view of the con-
ditions then and there existing. We consider these points 
seriatim: 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT 
CHAPMAN ATTEMPTED TO PASS THE HARTLEY AUTO-
MOBILE AT A DISTANCE SO CLOSE THAT THE JURY 
WOULD BE JUSTIFIED IN FINDING HIM GUILTY OF 
NEGLIGENCE. 
According to the testimony of Mrs. Hartley, she was 
proceeding along the extreme right hand edge of the 
highway. Her right wheels might have been off the hard 
surfaced portion of the road and on to the shoulder. 
Officer Levin testified that the lanes of traffic were about 
12 feet wide, and that the Hartley car was about six 
or seven feet wide. This would leave a distance of at 
least five to six feet between the left side of the Hartley 
car and the line dividing the two north bound lanes of 
traffic. Officer Levin also fixed the point of impact as 
one foot west of this dividing line. This would indicate 
a clearance distance of at least six to seven feet between 
the Hartley car and the oil truck. 
The witness Chapman testified that he was near the 
center line of the highway, or as he put it, "right against, 
or . . . over a little bit" from the center line (T. 91). 
He could not properly have proceeded further to the left 
without endangering south bound traffic. He also testi-
fied that he had "over three feet" or "quite a bit further 
than that" of clearance of the Hartley car (T. 91). 
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It is difficult to conceive how the defendant Chap-
man could have allowed more passing distance. Mrs. 
Hartley was on the extreme right hand side of the road, 
and he was as near the center as he could properly drive. 
Clearly the accident occurred, not by reason of any fault 
on the part of Chapman, in allowing insufficient clear-
ance of the Hartley automobile, but by reason of the 
Hartley automobile suddenly going out of control and 
into the oil truck. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANT CHAPMAN WAS NOT DRIVING AT 
AN EXCESSIVE RATE OF SPEED, AND THE ACCIDENT 
WAS NOT CAUSED BY ANY EXCESSIVE SPEED ON THE 
PART OF CHAPMAN. 
The argument that the oil truck was proceeding at 
an unsafe speed is equally without merit. While the 
speed of the truck was established practically without 
dispute at about 35 miles per hour at the moment of the 
accident, there is no competent evidence in the record 
that this was not a safe rate of speed for the truck to 
travel; and there is the uncontradicted expert testimony 
of Chapman himself, that 35 miles per hour was the 
minimum safe speed at which the truck could negotiate 
the hill. The plaintiff relies upon the testimony of the 
two police officers, fixing the maximum safe speed at 
15 to 20 miles per hour. However, as we pointed out in 
our statement of facts, such opinions, even if admissible, 
were based purely upon the officers' experience in oper-
ating ordinary passenger type vehicles. Both admitted, 
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that they had no knowledge or experience whatsoever 
with truck and trailer equipment, ,and admitted, that such 
equipment by reason of its much greater weight, larger 
number of wheels and other differences, might be safely 
operated at a greater rate of speed under the conditions 
prevailing on the evening of the accident. Chapman, on 
the other hand, who qualified as an expert in handling 
of large truck and trailer units, testified that the truck 
and trailer could not have been operated up the hill at a 
lesser speed than 35 miles per hour without danger of 
"spinning out," which would endanger not only that 
equipment, but also all other traffic on the highway. 
Even if a jury might find that 35 miles per hour 
was an excessive rate of speed under the circumstances, 
the evidence is clear, and without dispute, that the colli-
sion was not caused by speed, but was caused solely by 
the Hartley automobile going out of control and collid-
ing with the oil truck. The same result would have occur-
red, if the truck had been going only 20 miles per hour. 
POINT III. 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR HAS NO 
APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
As a sort of last resort, the plaintiff suggests that 
he should be entitled to go to the jury under the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur. It requires no extended argument to 
demonstrate that the doctrine has no application to the 
facts of this case. It is well settled that in order for that 
doctrine to apply, the instrumentality causing the dam-
age must have been under the sole and exclusive control 
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of the defendant, and that the accident must have been 
of such a nature that it would not ordinarily occur, ex-
cept as a result of negligent inspection, use or operation. 
Loos v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., (Ut.), 108 Pac. (2d) 
254. Neither element is present in this case. The truck 
was not in the exclusive control of Chapman and the 
Continental Oil Company. On the contrary, it had been 
knocked completely out of their control by the independ-
ent, intervening act of the defendant Hartley. 
Nor can skidding out of control be said to be such 
an event as will not ordinarily occur, except as a 
result of negligence on the part of the operator of the 
vehicle. On the contrary, courts have long and uni-
versally recognized that the most carefully operated ve-
hicle may slide from its operator's control on slick and 
slippery roads. 5A Am. Jur., 439, Automobiles and 
Highway Traffic, Sec. 341. The case of Barret v. Caddo 
Transfer & Warehouse Company, 165 La. 1075, 116 So. 
563, 58 ALE 261, cited and relied upon by the plaintiff, 
is ample authority on this point. The court there quoted 
with approval from Linden v. Miller, 172 Wis. 20, 177 
N.W. 909: 
"Skidding may occur without fault, and when 
it does occur it may likewise continue without 
fault for a considerable space and time. It means 
partial or complete loss of control of the car 
under circumstances not necessarily implying 
negligence. Hence Plaintiff's claim that the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the present 
situation is not well founded. In order to make 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply, it must be 
held that skidding itself implies negligence. This 
it does not. It is a well-known physical fact that 
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cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads with-
out fault either on account of the manner of han-
dling the car, or on account of its being there/9 
(Emphasis ours.) 
As was picturesquely said in UEcuyer v. Farns-
worth, 106 Vt. 180, 170 A. 677: 
"The sudden and unexpected skidding of an 
automobile is one of the natural hazards of driv-
ing cars on icy roads, and it may happen to the 
best of operators; and the viatic vagaries of auto-
mobiles when skidding on icy roads are as well 
known to automobile drivers as those of cows." 
Other cases to the same effect are found in the anno-
tation in 58 ALR, commencing at page 269, where it is 
said: 
"It has been generally held that the mere fact 
that an automobile skids on a slippery pavement 
does not of itself constitute evidence of negligence 
upon the driver's part so as to render the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine applicable." 
More recent decisions are collected in the annotation 
in 1.1.3 ALR, commencing at page 1014: 
Plaintiff relies upon the recent decision of an inter-
mediate appellate court of the state of California, Bar-
rera v. deLaTorre, (Cal. App.), 300 Pac, (2d) 100. We 
question the reasoning of the decision, but right or 
wrong, there were two distinguishing fact elements pres-
ent in that case not present here. First, in that case, there 
was dispute in the evidence as to whether there had been 
an antecedent collision between defendant's vehicle and 
a third vehicle which had caused the subsequent collision 
with plaintiff's building. This is of great importance 
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in determining whether defendant had exclusive control. 
In the case at bar, the evidence is undisputed, and was 
developed by the plaintiff himself, that the oil truck was 
knocked out of control by an antecedent collision with 
the Hartley automobile, and wholly without fault on the 
part of the operator of the oil truck. Secondly, the Cali-
fornia case did not involve icy slippery roads, such as 
were involved in the case at bar. And as above noted, 
skidding out of control on icy roads, does not necessarily 
bespeak negligence. 
POINT IV. 
IF DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF ANY NEGLI-
GENCE, PLAINTIFF WAS EQUALLY GUILTY OF CONTRI-
BUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
In directing ,a verdict for the defendants, the trial 
court took the position that the evidence showed conclu-
sively that the accident was an inevitable or unavoidable 
accident, not caused by the fault of any party to this 
action. In other words, the trial court found all of the 
parties free of negligence. We believe that this holding 
is not only supported, but compelled, by the evidence. 
However, we further contend that if the defendants were 
negligent in any of the particulars claimed by the plain-
tiff, it must necessarily follow that the plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence, for the record shows without 
dispute, that his conduct was of the same kind and 
nature as that of the defendants, and if what the defend-
ants did could be said to be negligence, it must follow 
that what the plaintiff did was likewise negligence. If it 
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was negligent for this defendant to travel 35 miles per 
hour up the hill, it was most certainly negligent for the 
plaintiff to travel 30 miles per hour down the hill. The 
plaintiff by his own admission had reason to suspect that 
the hill would be more icy than the level road, and a car 
going down hill is accelerated by gravity, whereas a car 
going up hill has the aid of gravity in stopping in the 
event of an emergency. Although the plaintiff claims to 
have reduced speed between the time he started down 
the hill, and the moment of impact, the evidence in this 
regard is very vague. However, the evidence is clear that 
he appreciated the danger of an accident 50 or 60 feet 
before the impact occurred, and that he was neither able 
to stop his automobile within that distance, nor was he 
able to reduce its speed appreciably. He struck the track 
with such force and violence, that both vehicles were 
damaged to the extent of $1200, and his own car bounced 
back up the hill six or eight feet. This was not a light 
blow. 
On page 13 of his brief, plaintiff suggests that the 
jury had the right to find that Mrs. Hartley was negli-
gent for even trying to negotiate the hill at the time of 
the accident. If this be so, the jury must also necessarily 
find that Denison was equally negligent in attempting to 
do the same thing. Contrary to another statement on 
page 13 of plaintiff's brief, Mrs. Hartley testified without 
contradiction or dispute, that she had experienced no 
difficulty negotiating the hill until the moment when 
she suddenly lost control of her car. Denison, on the 
other hand, admittedly had difficulty all the way down. 
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He first attempted to apply brakes, and found that had 
no effect whatsoever. He then shifted into second gear, 
and finally as a last resort cut off the ignition. All of 
this failed to avoid the accident. 
CONCLUSION 
Like counsel for the plaintiff, we have been unable 
to locate any cases so closely similar in point of fact, 
as might be said to be controlling or determinative of the 
case at bar. However, the general principles governing 
this case, are well settled. There is no evidence from 
which a jury might properly find that the defendants 
Chapman and Continental Oil Company failed to allow 
sufficient clearance in pas-sing the Hartley car, nor is 
there evidence to show excessive speed on the part of 
these defendants, or that speed on the part of these de-
fendants caused or contributed to cause the accident. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application to 
the facts of this case. The plaintiff was guilty of the 
same kind of conduct of which he complains on the part 
of the defendants. Either the accident was an unavoid-
able accident, not caused by the negligence of any party, 
as held by the trial court, or else the plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence, and as such, was equally 
culpable for his own loss, and therefore, not entitled to 
recover. In either event, the judgment of the trial court 
is correct, and should be affirmed. 
Eespectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for defendants and respondents 
Continental Oil Company and Chapman 
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